Abstract
Background: Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is not only a managerial tool and apolitical process, but it is also a political tool serving political objectives. In Western Uganda, government and non-governmental conservation organisations monitor and evaluate Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) projects in protected areas (PAs) and adjacent communities. However, politics of M&E influences how performance evidence is generated and used.
Objectives: This article explores the inevitable politics of M&E and their implications for evidence generation and use.
Method: The research was conducted in Queen Elizabeth National Park, Lake Mburo National Park and the Rwenzori Mountains National Park in Western Uganda and neighbouring communities. It involved Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) and three non-governmental conservation organisations supporting CBNRM in PAs and neighboring communities in Western Uganda. A qualitative research approach was applied using ethnographic research strategy. Data were collected through in-depth and informal interviews of conservation organisations’ staff, local leaders and communities, document analysis and participant observation.
Results: This study finds that M&E is aligned to generate performance evidence donors require, with little use locally. M&E politics determines the evidence generated, aligned to powerful interest and donor information needs. Political leaders demand participation in monitoring projects for political capital by demonstrating their commitment to electorate.
Conclusion: Dealing with M&E politics requires acknowledging its positive and negative implications and leveraging existing opportunities to achieve M&E objectives.
Contribution: This paper highlights how to deal with politics of M&E and underscores designing and conducting M&E as a technical and political process.
Keywords: monitoring; evaluation; politics; monitoring and evaluation; community-based natural resources management.
Introduction
Natural resources conservation organisations that were viewed as slow to adopt monitoring and evaluation (M&E) (Baylis et al. 2016:59) implemented it to generate evidence of conservation success (McKinnon et al. 2016:2). This is also the case of Western Uganda where government and non-governmental conservation organisations monitor and evaluate Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) programmes and projects in wildlife-protected areas (PAs) and adjacent communities. According to Holvoet and Rombouts (2011:331), there are politics across all sectors, and therefore research on the politics of M&E should be high on the agenda. However, the manifestations and consequences of politics of M&E are rarely studied (Bjørnholt & Larsen 2014:401; Holvoet & Rombouts 2011:312). Bjørnholt and Larsen (2014:401) argue that the political consequences of M&E are not analysed as there are no unique conceptual frameworks to facilitate such analysis.
This article presents the politics of M&E drawing from CBNRM in Western Uganda, and their implications on evidence generation and use and the ways government and non-governmental organisations should deal with it. The study leading to this paper was conducted in Western Uganda in three protected areas of Queen Elizabeth National Park, Lake Mburo National Park, Rwenzori Mountains National Park and adjacent communities. It involved the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) as the government wildlife-protected areas management agency and three non-governmental conservation organisations supporting CBNRM in and around the three PAs.
Background
There is a growing realisation that M&E is not only a managerial tool, an innocent and apolitical process, but also a political instrument whose processes can serve political objectives. Politics of M&E is understood to emerge from three pathways: the differences in stakeholders’ interests, values and beliefs on the organisation’s goals; how political decisions on organisations, programmes and project performance are made and the role of M&E in promoting accountability, transparency and resource allocations. Initially, conservation organisations’ internal and external stakeholders have different interests, values and beliefs about the organisation’s goals.
The key stakeholders with interest and influence on UWA’s conservation efforts include the central government of Uganda, especially the Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities, the parliament, local governments of districts and sub-counties neighbouring national parks, local leaders and communities. The main interest of local communities and leaders is benefits from conservation projects. This shapes the conception and production of M&E information to demonstrate how much local communities have benefited from the projects. Local governments are interested in participating in project implementation and monitoring to demonstrate their relevance in conservation activities and asserting their authorities as the custodians of communities and their development processes. To meet their interest, conservation M&E is accountability oriented. Equally, the ministry and parliament’s interest is on accountability for national budget allocated to UWA, but some members of parliament are inclined to demanding for protection of rights and benefits for the neighbouring communities who bear the cost of wildlife conservation such as crop raids. Donors are influential stakeholders for non-governmental conservation organisations, determining the kind of performance evidence produced.
The differing interests and conceptions of the organisation’s goals manifest the politics of M&E as the various stakeholders try to assert their conceptions of what constitutes the success or failure of programmes. Raimondo (2018:34) argues that stakeholders have different conceptions of the organisation’s goal and what constitutes programme success or failure. The constellation of the different interests on what to measure in a project and how to measure it makes M&E a political enterprise, which brings to the fore the debates of M&E being a political tool (Raimondo 2018:34).
The second pathway through which the politics of M&E emerges is how decisions on organisations, programmes and project performance are made. The political environment and dynamics influence decisions based on M&E information (Kimaro, Fourie & Tshiyoyo 2018a:111). This is consistent with the argument of Bjørnholt and Larsen (2014:401) that M&E influences the kind of political decisions conceived and how they are made and implemented. This may have far-reaching implications for programme success and failure. To mitigate adverse consequences, Kamau and Mohamed (2015:86) suggest that political influence on projects should be reviewed during M&E to decide whether a project will continue.
The third pathway is the role of M&E in promoting accountability, transparency and resource allocations, which are political decisions in nature. Kimaro et al. (2018a:112) argue that there are linkages between accountability, decision-making, resource allocation, rewarding and sanctioning and M&E information. As they are political in nature, the role of M&E in promoting them embeds it with politics, where one influences the other. What M&E and the associated politics mean are discussed in the following subsections.
Monitoring and evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation are two separate concepts that are often used as a single management tool (UNESCO 2016:7). Kusek and Rist (2004:12) view it as a management tool that informs public sector managers on progress towards achieving stated targets and goals and provides substantial evidence for any necessary mid-course corrections. Similarly, Görgens and Kusek (2009:1) consider M&E a powerful public management tool that can improve how government organisations achieve results. These conceptions resonate with Kimaro, Fourie and Tshiyoyo (2018b:203) definition, which consider it as an assessment of progress and achievements of predetermined performance levels of a given institution, project or programme. This paper considers M&E as a management process for tracking programme and project progress and measuring outcomes and impact results.
Politics
There is no uniform definition of politics. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2009:56) relates politics with how societies choose different policies to achieve their desired outcomes. Leftwich (2004:2) suggests that politics is about power’s form, distribution and control. On the other hand, Legorreta (2015:76) considers it as a means for scrutinising those with the power to influence the public sphere. Therefore, politics relates not only with governmental, political parties and electoral activities but also to how institutions and individuals pursue their interests and exercise power, control and decision-making. It influences most spheres of human interactions, including organisations and institutions (Ferris et al. 2018:469). These definitions demonstrate that politics is a concept that extends to all spheres, including M&E.
The politics of monitoring and evaluation
While there could be several definitions of the politics of M&E, Legorreta (2015) provides an encompassing definition for the politics of evaluation, which is applicable to monitoring as well. The politics of evaluation was defined as the way stakeholders use their resources and power to participate and influence the process and outcomes of evaluation according to their own agendas (Legorreta 2015:6). Therefore, the politics of M&E refers to how stakeholders influence the process and outcomes of M&E of programmes and projects (Legorreta 2015:7). This includes the external and internal pressures that may suppress, limit, delay, manipulate or selectively use M&E outputs (De Lay & Manda 2004:13). Raimondo (2018:34) argues that politics is used to achieve some predetermined goals and interests of some people that influence M&E.
Whereas some predetermined goals and interests may be negative to the broad objectives for M&E, others are positive. Scholars such as Porter and Goldman (2013:1) established there is increasing demand for M&E evidence through government-led evaluation systems in Uganda, South Africa and Benin. The scholars opine that political demand for M&E evidence in Uganda and South Africa has been demonstrated in regular cabinet discussion of reports (Porter & Goldman 2013:7). A decade later, Masvaure (2023:55) points out the pressure political leaders interested in demonstrating their capacity for service delivery to their citizens have requires evidence from monitoring.
Reaffirming that M&E is a political tool and process, the critical activities in M&E, such as selecting the relevant outcomes to measure, choosing methods of measuring progress, developing indicators and M&E plans, implementing M&E strategies and acting on the findings are not only methodological choices (technical), but they are also political choices (Oliver, Lorenc & Tinkler 2019:10). The pure technocratic character of M&E is being challenged as politics pervades its systems, processes, interpretation and utilisation of results (Holvoet & Rombouts 2011:330). It is argued that M&E performs both technical and political functions (Holvoet & Rombouts 2011:317; Oliver et al. 2019:5). This is why implementing a robust M&E system requires political commitment from higher to lower levels (Kimaro et al. 2018b:212). Therefore, it is essential to understand the politics of M&E and conceptualise the consequences (Bjørnholt & Larsen 2014:401).
Research aim and questions
This article explores the inevitable politics of M&E and the implications on evidence generation and use. The key research questions were:
How is the politics of M&E practised in evidence generation and use? What are the implications of the politics of M&E? How should organisations deal with the politics of M&E?
Research methods and design
A qualitative research approach was applied using ethnographic research strategy involving participant observation, in-depth interviews and informal interviews as methods for data collection. This approach provides opportunities for learning the situations and relationships (Tracy 2013:6) and studying people’s actions and accounts in everyday context. These data collection methods were applied following the suggestion of Woodhouse et al. (2015:3) who recommended semi-structured, informal interviews and participant observation for qualitative approach and ethnographic strategy.
Participant observation was conducted in Queen Elizabeth National Park and Lake Mburo National Park and adjacent communities for 9 months and 2 months at the headquarters of the UWA. Observation was aimed at understanding the politics of M&E of CBNRM in PAs and adjacent communities. In-depth interviews were conducted with 30 participants including the UWA and non-governmental conservation organisations’ staff, local communities and CBNRM and M&E researchers. Additionally, 39 respondents were engaged in informal interviews, primarily to follow up emerging issues observed and those noted from the formal in-depth interviews. Lastly, several primary documents including project activity reports, strategic and General Management Plans and policies were reviewed to understand how M&E is conducted, evidence generated and how politics influence them.
Ethical considerations
Ethical clearance to conduct this study was obtained from the University of Johannesburg, Faculty of Humanities Research Ethics Committee (No. REC-01-024-2020) and Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) (No. SS493ES).
Results and discussion
How the politics of monitoring and evaluation is practised in evidence generation and use in Western Uganda community-based natural resources management
The politics of M&E is practised during designing and planning for M&E to generate performance evidence, monitoring activities, evaluation and using M&E information for decision-making and performance improvement.
Politics in designing and planning for monitoring and evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation politics arise from what influences the design of goals, objectives and indicators, in whose interests are performance indicators developed, and the kind of information M&E is designed to produce. The planning and design of M&E for CBNRM in Western Uganda are tailored to respond to the global, national and donor-defined priorities and interests, but not local priority results, which would be the hallmark of CBNRM. Three examples demonstrate the politics in planning and designing M&E. The first is how conservation organisations supporting CBNRM in Western Uganda develop the goals, objectives and indicators used in performance measurement. They develop them in line with the global planning frameworks.
The government and non-governmental conservation organisations supporting CBNRM in Western Uganda demonstrate in their planning documents how their programmes align with international conventions, agreements and treaties such as the Paris Treaty, the Convention for Biological Diversity (CBD), the Convention on Elimination of International Trade on Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), among others. There is pressure to show the global goals and objectives that programme results contribute to, and M&E is purposed to serve that interest. Conservation organisations aligning their goals, objectives and performance indicators to these frameworks is also a political strategy to remain relevant. Bjørnholt and Larsen (2014:405) argue that although the process of goal setting is very technical and appears non-political on the surface, the administrative and political elites’ roles in the process and as the primary users make it political. Therefore, the global and national planning frameworks, which are primarily political, influence the M&E design to align performance indicators to them.
The second example is about who determines the M&E information generated. This study establishes that donors influence information M&E generates by determining the performance indicators used. On the surface, it appears that conservation organisations develop their indicators, but donors broadly determine the indicators by requiring some information that M&E is aligned to provide. This is particularly true with donor-funded projects designed by non-governmental conservation organisations, which was noted in all the three non-governmental conservation organisations. Therefore, some indicators that non-governmental conservation organisations use are influenced by what donors want to know about the project. Yet donors often align programme measures of success to the politics of their home countries (Grane 2013:22; Porter 2016:248). Conservation organisations supporting CBNRM in Western Uganda designed M&E to supply the information donors require, with little for organisations use in decision-making and performance improvement. This is using M&E to practice donor compliance politics. Consequently, M&E obfuscates knowledge generation by aligning its system to donor information needs.
The third example relates to skewed M&E information generated and shared. Some information is deliberately not produced as the indicators and relevant parameters are not included in the measurement frameworks. Similarly, others are masked in numbers that obscure the actual change created by CBNRM programmes and projects. The example from Human-Wildlife Conflict (HWC), which UWA implements in the study area, describes politics of M&E. They do not generate some critical information on HWC, including the level of damage the wild animals caused to local communities, such as the quantity of crops, acreage destroyed and number of livestock predated or killed. The missing information is essential to track how much local communities lose to crop raids and other destructions. However, UWA does not include those variables in the data collection tools, and such data are not collected. The question is why such vital information would be missing from the M&E design if not for fear of raising claims. Instead, UWA presents data showing how much communities have gained. M&E politics, in this example, involves obscuring information vital to understanding the HWC programme’s efficacy and the losses local communities incur.
The fundamental issue in the above example is that the planning and design of M&E serve the politics of aid compliance, helping conservation organisations produce information that keeps the relationship with funders and local communities. The design produces little information for organisations to use in decision-making and performance improvement.
Politics in monitoring activities
A critical element of CBNRM is community involvement, which is political by its character and design. M&E activities provide spaces to involve local leaders and communities in project reviews, monitoring and evaluating projects, but little effective involvement, all to reify conservation organisations’ power over local leaders and communities. Conservation organisations have used monitoring activities as opportunities to impress local communities to feel they are involved in their programmes. The article takes an example from Conservation World International, a pseudonym of one of the non-governmental conservation organisations, who involves local governments and community representatives in semi-annual review meetings. As there are limited consultations with beneficiary communities and local governments, review meetings are used as opportunities for engagement. This is primarily to increase buy-in, ownership and secure political support. Besides participating in review meetings, local leaders are involved in monitoring activities to support the project in case of any contestations on their performance.
The non-governmental conservation organisations in Western Uganda involve local political leaders to increase collaboration with the government and appear politically correct. The processes appear as genuine consultations and involvement but are political manoeuvres to secure support for programmes and projects. Waylen et al. (2019:375) argue that relevant programme performance information should be collected and analysed with many stakeholders’ genuine involvement and input. This is not what happens in CBNRM in Western Uganda. In an interview, a manager at Conservation Society International (pseudonym) expressed what typically happens in M&E for CBNRM in Western Uganda. He said:
‘Most times, communities are just informed. We sit here to use our best experience and develop a project proposal. After, we engage them to have buy-in and say this is what we will monitor; sometimes, we say we want to work with you.’ (Interviewee 018, Male, Manager)
Therefore, M&E activities provide spaces to engage critical stakeholders as political means to securing support for CBNRM programmes.
The manifestations of the politics of M&E in CBNRM in Western Uganda include the question of who is involved in monitoring activities and why. Conservation organisations engage technical and political local leaders in monitoring CBNRM activities, and most political leaders in Western Uganda want to be involved. Politicians want to participate in monitoring activities to gain political capital, posturing as a leader working for their communities. Equally, conservation organisations do not care much about politicians using their programmes for their political gains if their participation increases project’s political acceptability and visibility. This is consistent with the argument of Holvoet and Rombouts (2011:313) that the interests and roles of those involved in M&E are essential. Often, different M&E participants pursue their interests leading to conflicts and contradictions. The involvement of local leaders in monitoring programme and project activities makes M&E a political instrument for sustaining local support for conservation more than the alleged technical role in promoting organisational learning and improving the programme performance.
Equally, the information generated through monitoring processes aims to prove PA benefits to local communities and justify conservation actions, primarily for political expedients. This was noted from the Lake Mburo National Park’s data on fish stock. Local communities were permitted to fish in Lake Mburo for domestic consumption and sale. As part of monitoring processes, the government conservation organisation collects data on the number of fish caught, especially the kilograms caught, the number of catches sold, the number of fish retained for domestic consumption and the money value gained by local community fishermen. However, the monitoring effort was to demonstrate how much local communities benefited from this arrangement, for political expedients as previously argued. An interview with a ranger at Lake Mburo National Park elucidates this finding. The ranger said, ‘Our data stops at how much the communities have benefited’ (Interviewee 015, Female, Ranger).
The rationale for monitoring is to generate information to prove PA benefits to local communities and increase their support for management and conservation. The government conservation organisation uses this information to play the politics of natural resources management (NRM). The data collected serves one particular purpose, that is legitimising what Bjørnholt and Larsen (2014:405) term the rhetoric of performance measurement, which are political manoeuvres through M&E.
Politics in evaluation of community-based natural resources management programmes and projects
Evaluation is expected to be neutral and objective so that lessons can be used for performance improvement or designing similar projects. In Western Uganda, the government conservation organisation conducts internal evaluation, primarily midterm and end of term for their strategic plans, which is an important function for performance improvement. Non-governmental conservation organisations evaluate some of their projects using external consultants. However, there is politics in how they conduct evaluations, making it report what it would have not. This paper will illustrate, with three examples, the politics in evaluation across conservation organisations supporting CBNRM in Western Uganda.
The politics in evaluations conducted by external consultants who are considered independent, as they are not employees, is practised when organisations are developing the terms of reference, during report reviews and feedback. Terms of reference prescribe what these organisations and donors want to know from evaluation. Organisations’ interest and powers are manifested in the terms of reference, which guide consultants. Whereas there are the OECD criteria of evaluation, the organisation can choose the depth. When an evaluation report is submitted, it is subjected to reviews and feedback provided to consultants. This is another opportunity where politics is introduced in terms of safeguarding organisations’ interests.
An in-depth interview with a project manager in Conservation World International demonstrates how organisations’ interests are safeguarded using evaluation. The project manager said:
‘We know how to engage consultants to give a clear report. We engage on how we want results to be presented.’ (Interviewee 016, Male, Senior Manager)
In the process of engaging to produce what he called a clear report, interests and power are manifested. According to Porter (2016:246), evaluation represents acts of power, especially when prioritising the diverse interests, passing judgement and proposing alternative solutions. While some consultants may not write quality reports requiring extensive feedback to improve them, this process often leads to influencing evaluation to serve some specific interests. The findings and recommendations that are of interest to conservation organisations are often appreciated, and a lot of clarity is asked on those that are not. For example, findings that show good project performance are welcomed quickly even when not clear enough. Those indicating poor performance are not of interest, and as such more clarity and evidence are always sought, not to understand better and do differently in future but dispute them.
The other aspect of the politics in evaluation is about who has and exercises power. In the interview with the project manager stated above, it can be observed that conservation organisations exercise power to determine how results are presented. This makes their project evaluations very political, manifesting organisations’ power in determining the results to report. This is consistent with Bjørnholt and Larsen (2014:401) who argue that performance measurements are not politically neutral as they serve some interests. It can then be argued that non-governmental conservation organisations have powerful interests that are served. The primary interest that influences evaluation is ensuring the continuity of project funding.
How politics is practised in the evaluation was also observed on how UWA evaluates their strategic and General Management Plans (GMPs). In an evaluation at the end of the strategic plan 2013–2018, which was conducted before developing the strategic plan 2020–2025, the primary respondents were the staff. This internal evaluation denotes that they were the evaluators and also the respondents. Other critical actors in CBNRM, including local leaders and communities adjacent to the PAs, were neither interviewed nor participated in focus group discussions to provide evaluable information. This was because there was little funding while there was a need to demonstrate to stakeholders that an evaluation was conducted to inform the next strategic plan. Raimondo (2018:34) argues that evaluation is not merely a tool to assess the merit and worth of projects or programmes; it is used to institutionalise roles, relationships and mandates among organisations’ stakeholders and critical actors. Fulfilling the expectations of key stakeholders who require evaluation is a political consideration. In this way, evaluation processes and results are influenced (see Bjørnholt & Larsen 2014; Porter 2016; Raimondo 2018).
Whereas UWA conducted evaluations without external input, some studies point out that gathering diverse views is critical for meaningful evaluation. For instance, Raimondo (2018:34) argues that critical stakeholders have competing definitions of success, and their views should be considered. Porter (2016:247) argues that it is essential to prioritise the interests of those who often do not wield significant political power to influence the outcome of the evaluation and utilisation of the findings. The views of those who do not wield any power should also be considered in the evaluation. According to Bjørnholt and Larsen (2014:402–406), the primary purpose of evaluations is to provide robust knowledge that politicians can use to create policy changes, sanction poor performance and reward good performances. Therefore, as Picciotto (2017:313) points out, gathering evaluation evidence from diverse stakeholders considering facts, meaning and their power is critical.
Politics in using monitoring and evaluation findings and recommendations
When asked about how their organisation uses M&E findings and recommendations, a manager in one of the conservation organisations supporting CBNRM in Western Uganda said:
‘We conducted a midterm review of the strategic plan and made recommendations. On those recommendations if they decide against them, your recommendations will be ignored.’ (Interviewee 032, Female, Manager)
In this organisation, recommendations that seek change in organisations’ top management ways of working are often ignored. Other examples of recommendations that are decided against even if they maximise results include those seeking to change budget priorities, human resource management structure and funds management. Recommendations for small changes and those urging staff to work harder, double their efforts, are usually accepted.
Another conservation organisation staff said, ‘Information is there, but when it comes to decision-making, they make their own’ (Interviewee 027, Female, Manager). These demonstrate that conservation organisation managers make their decisions without using the M&E recommendations provided. The question is how they decide on the M&E findings to adopt and the recommendations to implement. These choices are based on other factors, such as priorities of senior management, the cost of implementing a recommendation and the interest of influential stakeholders like central and local governments and donors.
In their study of the politics of M&E under the changing aid modalities in the Rwanda health sector, Holvoet and Rombouts (2011:314) argue that decision-making on the recommendations to implement and those to ignore is explained by interests and power positions, which are political matters. In Western Uganda Protected Areas, when M&E data are collected and analysed and a report is written with recommendations submitted to managers, politics play a crucial role in deciding the recommendations to adopt. The recommendations that offer little ramifications on, for example, the relationships with local governments in PA adjacent districts and sub-counties are considered. To bring this discussion into perspective, the revenue-sharing funded projects are used to provide a good example.
The government conservation organisation provides tourism revenue-sharing funds to local governments to implement community projects. The conservation organisation monitors the projects, but their findings and recommendations often question the efficiency and frugality of local governments in revenue-sharing fund utilisation and project outputs. However, the organisation management takes care by not implementing recommendations that disinterest local governments. If this is not politics, then what is it? This is how the conservation organisation uses M&E to play the politics of natural resources management (NRM), aiming to keep local communities and leaders happy with conservation initiatives.
In both government and non-governmental conservation organisations, recommendations from evaluation are taken more seriously than those from monitoring. This is because evaluation findings and recommendations serve broader political constituencies, including local, national, technical and political leaders and donors. Donor interest in evaluation findings is high compared to monitoring, which is considered more internal. Recommendations from routine monitoring are not taken so seriously because donors rarely ask for the reports. Conservation organisations treat monitoring reports as ‘our thing’. As outside stakeholders do not demand it, critical recommendations raised from monitoring are not given due attention. This is different from how evaluation reports are considered, especially if negative results are reported because their consequences are also high, including loss of funding. This narrative suggests that it is not about the information evaluation produces, rather the externally powerful and influential audience it serves. Thus, it is all about M&E politics shaping organisations behaviours, actions and priorities.
The implications of the politics of monitoring and evaluation on evidence generation and use
The politics of M&E has both positive and negative implications (De Lay & Manda 2004:14). On the one hand, it generates interest and demand for M&E, which provides opportunities to improve it for CBNRM. On the other hand, the politics of M&E stifles the generation and use of independent, accurate and valid evidence. The government conservation organisation’s M&E system is guided by the government’s regulatory framework, particularly the Uganda national M&E policy (Office of the Prime Minister 2011:2). The non-governmental conservation organisations’ M&E systems are influenced by guidelines from their donors and agencies.
The government and donor politics influence the regulations and guidelines for M&E that can be put in place to improve evidence generation and utilisation. This is consistent with the argument of Kimaro et al. (2018a:112) that politics impact regulatory frameworks in which national and donor-driven M&E systems operate. For example, the guidelines for revenue sharing with local communities provided a regulatory framework on how M&E should be conducted, including the percentage of funds allocated to local government for M&E, but politics influenced the guidelines. In turn, politics determines the kind of M&E that could be contemplated and used for programme and/or project performance evidence generation.
In Western Uganda, the politics of M&E for CBNRM subvert the implementation of some of the recommendations that are perceived to interfere with stakeholders’ collaboration in NRM. M&E recommendations could have been made based on evidence. The government conservation organisation perceives some political stakeholders, such as central and local governments, as sensitive. So, care is taken to manage their interest and motivation towards supporting CBNRM initiatives or at least not to oppose them. This limited the powers that the government conservation organisation would exercise to implement the necessary actions. On the other hand, taking care of the interests of different stakeholders cements the ‘collaboration’ in managing natural resources in PAs in Western Uganda.
The politics of M&E have substantial implications on various stakeholders’ utilisation of M&E information. The utilisation of M&E information is significantly higher when high political stakes are associated with information generation. Porter (2016:248) argues that findings will likely be used when evaluations are demanded and commissioned from higher political entities. Government and non-government conservation organisations are keen to implement top government leaders, politicians, donors and other key stakeholders’ recommendations. This is because a failure to implement recommendations from top government leaders potentially discredits organisations.
Further, the responsiveness of organisation managers in implementing recommendations with high political stakes is primarily because the level of responsibility and accountability is higher. They can be asked to account for improvements made resulting from M&E findings. In Western Uganda, the fear of sanctions from political and local communities increases commitment of PA staff to deliver on the general expectations of governments and local communities. On the other hand, fear of sanctions increases contestation of monitoring results when the findings indicate unsatisfactory performance. Organisations link the performance in programme implementation to individuals, which exposes them to sanctions and rewards.
Therefore, the politics of M&E is a ‘double-edged sword’; it is sharp from both sides. It provides opportunities to improve M&E, especially the generation and consumption of performance evidence, but it also hinders it by stifling the generation of independent, accurate and valid M&E evidence. It can be argued that the politics of M&E is not necessarily bad; it is a necessary evil with positive and negative implications but knowing how to deal with it is critical.
Dealing with the implications of the politics of monitoring and evaluation
Whereas there was minimal evidence of how the conservation organisations in Western Uganda deal with M&E politics, globally, various literature explains how organisations should deal with it. Holvoet and Rombouts (2011:311) argue that M&E politics should not be understood negatively when the genuine interests of M&E have not been subverted, but where it has been, then it should not be stubbornly overlooked. For CBNRM in Western Uganda, conservation organisations were active actors effectively dealing with M&E politics. Porter (2016:248) suggests it is necessary to become politically savvy to deal with the politics of M&E.
According to Holvoet and Rombouts (2011:331), persistent exclusion and denial of the importance and presence of political issues in M&E may undermine M&E functions of accountability and learning. Holvoet and Rombouts (2011:326) suggest that dealing with the politics of M&E requires acknowledging that it exists, with both positive and negative implications, and leveraging on the existing opportunities to achieve M&E objectives. Therefore, the first step of dealing with M&E politics is to acknowledge its existence. The second step is for M&E professionals to proactively respond to M&E politics. Monitoring and evaluation professionals must go beyond just knowing the technical know-how of monitoring and evaluation, to understanding the political economy within which projects are implemented, and M&E operates. They must understand stakeholder interests and preferences as well as the barriers and incentives to their objective participation in M&E processes. This is what Porter (2016:248) calls being politically savvy.
In evaluation, the central question is how those doing evaluation can consider politics in their work without becoming a political tool (Kaliba-Hapunda & Hapunda 2018:134). This can be primarily achieved through trust building between the evaluation team and the key stakeholders (Kaliba-Hapunda & Hapunda 2018:135) and navigating the powerful interests to achieve the purpose of evaluation (Porter 2016:247). M&E professionals designing and implementing evaluations must become politically savvy but operate within robust systems to avoid subduing evaluation objectives (Porter 2016:248). They must have the power to control evaluation processes and limit political ramifications (Picciotto 2017:313). While power is necessary, care should be taken to avoid offending too many interests because implementing remedial actions requires other actors who may withhold their input when their interests are offended (Porter 2016:247).
Dealing with the politics of M&E in CBNRM requires upholding ethics in data generation. This can be achieved by building an M&E system that produces accurate and verifiable information on inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact. Ethical dilemmas in generating information on inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact reduce confidence in information and increase political pressures (Kaliba-Hapunda & Hapunda 2018:124). Increased confidence and trust in the generated data can ensure acceptance and appreciation of the information.
Conclusion
Politics influences how conservation organisations design and plan M&E for CBNRM in PAs and adjacent communities in Western Uganda to respond to donor information needs and other powerful interests and rarely to meet the local needs. It determines the kind of M&E that is contemplated. Conservation organisations use M&E to conform to the politics of aid. They use it to make donors happy by supplying the required information, yet little is provided for the organisations’ own decision-making. Thus, limited information on programme performance that resonates with organisations and local communities’ needs is generated. Therefore, M&E professionals should transform systems to reflect local nuances and use community knowledge, values and beliefs to shape the M&E agenda and politics.
There is a symbiotic relationship between M&E and politics. The local leaders are involved in M&E to gain their support for conservation programmes or reduce opposition and resistance to PA management activities. Engaging technical and political local leaders in monitoring CBNRM activities in the communities embeds politics in the process. Politicians demand M&E information from PA management to provide evidence of the benefits to local communities and use it to hold the management accountable. The conservation organisations also use local leaders to monitor and give credibility to their projects.
Monitoring and evaluation is a political enterprise. Not only do they reflect acts of power, control and influence of the organisations, but they also serve the broader political interest of donors and key stakeholders with positive and negative consequences. Dealing with M&E politics is far better than ignoring it. Adapting to the technical and political characters of M&E is necessary because the environment in which M&E operates is multifaceted with different interests coalesced by political and regulatory frameworks. This requires, firstly, an acknowledgement that the politics of M&E exist and, secondly, building robust M&E systems that produce accurate, verifiable and reliable information on the performance of CBNRM programmes and projects. Thirdly, M&E professionals should have the skills and expertise to navigate politics and conflicting stakeholder interests and influence effectively to ensure the purpose, value and integrity of M&E is not compromised by any stakeholder who holds greater power and influence.
This article highlights a new perspective on M&E; one that considers M&E not only as a technical process but also as a political instrument. This consciousness is an innovation in evaluation practice with added value to M&E effectiveness. The paper addresses what M&E practitioners have been grappling with, that is, dealing with the inevitable politics in M&E at institutional and local levels.
Acknowledgements
This article is partially based on the authors PhD thesis entitled ‘Monitoring and Evaluation of Community-Based Natural Resources Management in Western Uganda’, towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Development Studies (Monitoring and Evaluation) in the Department of Anthropology and Development Studies, University of Johannesburg, South Africa, with supervisor Professor Joost Fontein and co-supervisor Dr. Christopher Phiri, received March 2025.
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no financial or personal relationships that may have inappropriately influenced him in writing this article.
Author’s contributions
I.O.-O., is the sole author of this research article.
Funding information
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author, I.O.-O., upon reasonable request.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and are the product of professional research. It does not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated institution, funder, agency or that of the publisher. The author is responsible for this article’s results, findings and content.
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